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THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS: LEGAL SERVICES
EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF THE POOR
Lawrence E. Rothstein*
In Greek mythology there is a story about the tyrant, Sisyphus, who is
condemned to suffer everlasting anguish. Eternally, he rolls a huge rock
up the steep side of a mountain only to have it roll down again just as he
reaches the top. Such is the plight in which the poor person finds himself
when confronting the legal system. If the poor individual is able to over-
come the massive obstacles placed between him and full, fair litigation of
his case, he finds that the rules to be applied to the case are stacked
against him. This situation is not necessarily a consequence of corruption
or conscious bias on the part of the officials of the legal system; there is
no "evil man" at whom to point a finger. The plight of the poor is, rather,
the consequence of a legal system to which access is gained on a compet-
itive basis. In this system, those whose lives have been characterized by
an inability to participate effectively in the political or economic markets
are severely handicapped.
When poor persons turn for aid to a program that provides free legal
services, such as Legal Aid or an Office of Economic Opportunity Legal
Services program, they turn to programs whose'most direct and realistic
legal attack on the systemic barriers to justice for the poor has been se-
verely criticized. It is said that by concentrating on group organization and
representation, economic development, lobbying and legislative drafting,
test cases, and class actions, the attorneys for the poor are sacrificing their
clients' interests for their own social and economic predilections. 1 This
argument appears to have carried the day with the Nixon administration. 2
What these critics may have overlooked is the fact that the develop-
ment of poverty law strategies and techniques is an attempt to offset the
use of similar strategies and techniques by members of the bar who rep-
* Assistant Professor of Justice and the Social Order, Sangamon State University.
B.A., 1966, Carleton College; J.D., 1969, University of Illinois College of Law.
The author wishes to thank Professor Marc Galanter, of the State University of
New York at Buffalo, whose unpublished seminar outline, Why the 'Haves' Come
Out Ahead, has stimulated many of the ideas expressed in this paper. Thanks are
also expressed for thoughtful comments and suggestions from Professors Craig Brown,
Doug Morgan, and Conrad Rutkowski of Sangamon State University.
1 See generally Brill, The Uses and Abuses of Legal Assistance, 31 PUB. INTEREST
38 (1973).
2 Agnew, What's Wrong with the Legal Services Program, 58 A.B.A.J. 930 (1972).
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resent powerful, organizational clients. The use of controversial methods
in providing legal services for the poor is a natural response to a legal
system that gives large, organized interests tremendous legal advantages
over individuals, particularly poor individuals. Critics are objecting to the
poverty lawyers' trying to function like corporate lawyers in order to wrest
a few advantages for the poor out of a system which places a premium on
political and economic clout.
I. SUCCESS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM
Enumeration of certain aspects of the legal system, and the inferences
about the successful litigant that can be drawn from these aspects, will
help clarify the thesis stated above.
1. The legal system exists within a society characterized by an uneven
distribution of resources. The inequalities, however, are dispersed rather
than being cumulative. No one individual has all of the resources neces-
sary to consistently influence decisions in his favor.
3
2. The legal system is a competitive process in which every participant
attempts to pyramid resources and use them to influence decisions in his
favor. The results of this process are often negotiation and compromise.
4
3. The official participants in the legal system in most cases apply
existing legal norms, phrased for general application, without conscious
bias or inequality.5 As human beings, however, the participants are sub-
ject to an array of social and psychological influences, often at a subcon-
scious level.
6
4. The legal system has complex procedural rules that require the lay-
man to engage specialized assistance for action within the system.
5. The rules applied in the legal system are promulgated and changed
in two ways: by imposition from the external political system, and by
decisions made as a result of the litigation process.
7
6. A wide range of disputes which arise in society are referred to the
legal system for settlement.8
3 For a comprehensive discussion of the "pluralist" view of political power in the
context of urban affairs see R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? (1961).
4 Aubert, Competition and Dissensus: Two Types of Conflict and of Conflict Reso-
lution, 7 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 26 (1963); Friedman, Judicial Rules and the Vol-
ume of Business, in SOCIETY AND THE LEGAL ORDER 378 (R. Schwartz & J. Skolnick
eds. 1970).
5 S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, THE FEDERAL COURTS AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM 35
(1971).
6 See J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 146-56.(1963).
7 Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, in LAW AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
736 (L. Friedman & S. Macaulay eds. 1969). The promulgation of court rules by
higher courts to lower courts in a judicial system is, in a sense, a product of both
imposition from the outside and internal processes.
8 In one of his pithy statements about American society, de Tocqueville remarked
that "[s]carcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved,
sooner or later, into a judicial question." 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 280 (1945).
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7. The insufficiency of institutional resources in the legal system pre-
vents the full consideration of every case on its merits. The legal system,
therefore, discourages parties from commencing litigation and encourages
them to settle pending cases. 9
These aspects of the legal system dictate the conditions under which a
party may achieve success.
There are a number of inferences about successful litigants that can be
drawn through analysis of the aspects described above. It may be inferred
from aspects 1 and 2 that organized interests have an advantage in pros-
ecuting claims in the legal system.10 And, although it may be assumed for
the sake of argument that a litigant is not subject to conscious bias and
intentional discrimination, he nevertheless is subject to the subliminal
values, expectations, and moods of the official participants in the legal
system (see aspect 3). Those who share those values, meet those expecta-
tions, and cater to those moods will have a clear advantage over those
who are unable or unwilling to do so." Similarly, access to high-quality
legal assistance will be positively correlated with success in the legal sys-
tem (see aspect 4).12
Aspect 5 supports the inference that rule changes in the legal system
that are favorable to a participant are achieved through the successful
pursuit of cases and appeals in both higher courts and legislatures. Suc-
cess leads to more success; but an initial failure or inability to follow
through to higher levels of the legal or political systems severely limits
the probability of future success. 1" The legal system is an important
arena for the settlement of disputes and cannot generally be avoided
except by agreement of the parties or the inability of one party to gain
access to the system because of a lack of resources (see aspect 6).
14
Delay, caused by institutional overload, is also an important factor that
operates to encourage negotiated settlements (see aspect 7).15 A party
unable to endure delay will be forced into an unfavorable negotiating
position. If a party is not able to secure reasonably favorable outcomes in
the legal system, his success in the larger political arena will be, or per-
haps already has been, severely limited.
The ability to participate successfully in the legal system is thus very
much controlled by the nature of the system. The nature of the system,
9 H. JACOB, JUSTICE IN AMERICA 184-87 (1965).
10 For a discussion of the importance of organization in the pursuit of legal reme-
dies against racial discrimination see C. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY (1959).
11 Jaros & Mendelsohn, The Judicial Role and Sentencing Behavior, in LAW AND
THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 855 (L. Friedman & S. Macaulay eds. 1969).
12 Cahn & Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317,
1336 (1964); Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 381 (1965).
13 S. MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BALANCE OF POWER, THE AUTOMOBILE MANU-
FACTURERS AND THEIR DEALERS (1966); Shapiro, Political Jurisprudence, 52 Ky. L.
REV. 294 (1964).
14 S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, supra note 5, at 205-14.
15 H. ZEISEL, H. KALVEN, JR. & B. BUCHOLZ, DELAY IN COURT xxii-xxVi (1959).
SPRING 19741
Journal of Law Reform
as described herein, is "pluralist." Pluralist systems operating in the po-
litical arena have been severely criticized by political scientists. The same
criticisms are valid when applied to a pluralist legal system. While such
a system hinders some segments of society (particularly the poor) from
effectively participating in its benefits, the system pyramids the advantages
received by other segments of society. 16 Producing evidence in support
of this criticism is a major objective of 'this article. In the interim, suffice
it to say that money and organizational support are important resources
for success in the legal system.
The interest-aggregation process ignores some concerns that are shared
by many citizens primarily because active, organized, and legitimate
groups do not give these concerns a high priority. 17 The problems of
consumers long failed to evoke public concern. Until very recently, with
the advent of a strong consumer movement, legislation and regulation on
behalf of consumers only consisted of prohibitions on fraudulent and de-
ceptive practices. Some attention is now also being paid to problems of
high prices, lack of choice, lack of consumer bargaining power, and lack
of knowledge about nutrition and safety.
18
Latent concerns, which might well be of interest to many citizens if
they were publicly articulated as issues, are either not identified or are
identified only as to superficial aspects of the concern.1 9 For example, in
the legal system the concepts of standing and actual or threatened injury
play a crucial role in determining who may go to court, on what grounds,
and for what relief. Although these concepts have been periodically ex-
panded and contracted, there is a large "mobilization of bias" against
raising the question of the desirability of making every man the keeper of
his brother's legal rights with standing to vindicate these rights in court. 20
The mobilization of bias in the prevailing system of issue-formation
and conflict-resolution discourages the extension of participation to "out"
groups, the serious, public consideration of unorganized or unarticulated
concerns, and the internal reforms conducive to personal development. 21
Clement Vose, in chronicling the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People's (NAACP) attack on racially restrictive cove-
nants, notes the existence of the mobilization of bias against integrated
housing patterns:
It was through organized activity that white property owners
protected their interest in living apart from Negroes. Neighbor-
16 Connolly, The Challenge to Pluralist Theory, in THE BIAS OF PLURALISM 18-19
(W. Connolly ed. 1969).
17 Id.
18 For example, the cost and quality of legal services has only recently emerged as
a priority issue because of the consumer movement. The Cost of Legal Services
Emerges as Major Consumer Issue, 1 MEDIA AND CONSUMER 5-6 (1973).
19 Connolly, supra note 16, at 18-19.
20Wasserstrom, Lawyers and Revolution, in RADICAL LAWYERS 83-84 (J. Black
ed. 1971).
21 Connolly, supra note 16, at 18-19.
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hood property associations functioned in Los Angeles, Chicago,
New York, Detroit, Baltimore, St. Louis, Washington, and other
cities. They drafted restrictions, had them officially recorded and
guarded against violations. These associations usually worked
closely with organized real-estate interests within each city to
prevent sale of covenanted property to Negroes. Out of defer-
ence to these powers, local newspapers refused advertisements
offering to sell real estate in white areas to Negroes. Individual
owners were implored not to sell to colored people. When these
informal means failed, the white property-owners' groups, called
variously protective, improvement, or citizens' associations,
brought legal action and gained injunctions from courts which
forbade violators from owning or using particular property.
Their success in gaining enforcement of these privately drawn
covenants developed patterns of racial segregation in northern
cities.
22
For thirty years, the NAACP engaged in the type of organization and
litigation for which lawyers for the poor have been criticized. Finally,
racially restrictive covenants were successfully raised to a national issue
and subsequently struck down by the Supreme Court. Today, almost
thirty years after the decision in Shelley v. Kraemer,23 racially segregated
residential housing patterns still exist in most northern cities.
Thus, living conditions and decision-making processes in a modern,
pluralistic society are often not conducive to the personal development of
its citizens that allows them to lead satisfying lives and prevents apathy,
hostility, and violent upheaval.2 4 That this condition exists in modern
American society is the message of the Report of the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders. The Commission made this finding par-
ticularly with regard to the poor in the legal system:
The belief is pervasive among ghetto residents that lower courts
in our urban communities dispense "assembly line" justice; that
from arrest to sentencing, the poor and uneducated are denied
equal justice with the affluent, that procedures such as bail and
fines have been perverted to perpetuate class inequities. We
have found that the apparatus of justice in some areas has itself
become a focus for distrust and hostility. Too often the courts
have operated to aggravate rather than relieve the tensions that
ignite and fire disorders.2 5
In the following parts of this article, the operation of the mobilization
of bias against the poor in the legal system is more closely scrutinized,
and the legal services response to the imbalance of resources available
to the poor is outlined.
22 C. VOSE, supra note 10, at 250.
23 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
24 Connolly, supra note 16, at 18-19.
25 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 337
(1968).
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II. THE POOR AS PARTICIPANTS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM
The litigants in the legal system can be divided into two general classes
-those whose participation is a unique or rare event, i.e. they have only
one or a few cases in their lifetime, and those who have a large volume
of legal business. Examples of the single-case participant are the spouse
in a divorce case, the debtor in a collection case, the defendant in a crim-
inal prosecution, and a welfare recipient in a suit against the welfare
agency. Large-volume participants are the various levels of government
or their agencies, large business corporations, labor unions, collection agen-
cies, and insurance companies. Large-volume participants are usually or-
ganized interests with substantial financial resources and legal business of
a specialized nature (e.g., an automobile insurance company defending
against personal injury claims). The single-case participant is a consider-
ably smaller economic unit, usually unsupported by organized interests,
unfamiliar with the legal process, and financially burdened by the litiga-
tion.
This description of the participants in the legal system clearly shows the
category in which the poor are found. They are single-case participants.
The poor appear in court as 'individuals and are unlikely to be supported
by organized interests. 26 They are generally unfamiliar with and hostile to
court and administrative procedures.27 The poor also lack the financial
resources to pursue effective court action. Money is a generalized source
of power over people and institutions. The lack of money, i.e. poverty, is
an extreme form of powerlessness over one's social situation and one's
ability to carry out decisions and plans of action. 28
The disadvantage at which the poor are placed by possessing the char-
acteris-tics of single-case participants is exceeded only by the disadvantage
of constantly finding themselves opposed by large-volume participants.
The poor generally find themselves in court as debtors being sued by
collection agencies and business organizations, as prospective or former
clients of administrative agencies opposing agency actions against them,
as defendants in criminal cases and respondents in juvenile cases being
prosecuted by the government, and as tenants being evicted by govern-
mental or corporate landlords or land trusts.2 9 Even in family law mat-
ters, where the more affluent are usually opposed by other single-case
participants, the poor are typically confronted by the state and its agen-
cies. For the affluent, uncontested divorces go smoothly, and custody mat-
26 Axelrod, Urban Structure and Social Participation, 21 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV.
13 (1956). Formal group membership is positively correlated with income, status, and
education.
27 Weiss, The Law and the Poor, 26 J. OF SOCIAL ISSUES 59 (1970).
28 Haggstrom, The Power of the Poor, in POVERTY IN AMERICA 315 (L. Ferman, J.
Kornbluh & A. Haber eds. 1968).
29 Stumpf, Law and Poverty: A Political Perspective, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 694, 699
(1968); cf. Jacob, Winners and Losers . . . Garnishment and Bankruptcy In Wis-
consin, in THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 69, 77 (A. Blumberg ed., 1970); Rothstein, Appoint-
ment of Counsel in Massachusetts Criminal Cases, 6 SUFFOLK L. REV. 855 (1972).
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ters are raised only among family members. For the poor, family law is
public, political, and penal in character, with state and local agencies in-
volving themselves in the most intimate family relationships. Family law,
for the poor, is a part of the welfare system.
3 0
The position as debtor-defendant in small claims court is characteristic
of the role in which the poor find themselves as participants in the legal
system. This type of court was originally intended to remove the disadvan-
tages attaching to the single-case, and especially the poor, participant.
The features of low cost, lack of formality, and discouragement of repre-
sentation by counsel in small claims courts were enacted in an effort to
put the single-case participant on a par with the large volume participant.
The vast majority of the cases in the small claims courts, however, are
brought against the poor by businesses, collection agencies, and govern-
mental units. Most of these large-volume participants regularly use the
small claims court for collection purposes.3 1 Here again, the poor must
return to the foot of the mountain and commence their laborious ascent.
III. THE PYRAMIDING OF ADVANTAGES OVER THE POOR
A. The Large-Volume Litigant
How does the large-volume litigant pyramid his advantages over the
single-case participant in the legal system? The large-volume litigant is
likely to have very specialized legal business. This specialization allows for
advantages such as economies of scale, routine and efficient treatment of
legal matters, and the avoidance of litigation. The resources of the large-
volume litigant can be most effectively allocated among its cases to achieve
the most propitious results. Through planning, compensatory action can
be taken to greatly reduce the uncertainties in the legal system.
32
Large-volume litigants use their lawyers' time largely for achieving fa-
vorable results, while at the same time trying to avoid litigation.33 Large
business corporations, government agencies, and labor unions-often have
in-house legal staffs which vie with large law firms in size and excel-
lence. 34 Litigation is avoided by incorporating legal advice into business
planning. Since World War I, civil business litigation has become a de-
creasing share of the services of law firms to businesses, while advice and
business counseling have greatly increased. 35 Large-volume litigants are
30 tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development,
and Present Status (pts. 1-3), 16 STAN. L. REV. 257, 900 (1964); 17 id. 614 (1965).
31 JUDICIAL RESEARCH FOUNDATION, STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 39 (1969); Note,
The Persecution and Intimidation of the Low-Income Litigant as Performed by the
Small Claims Court in California, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1657 (1969); cf. Comment, The
California Small Claims Court, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 876 (1964).
32 For the importance of large volume, specialization, and planning in maximizing
gains and minimizing losses see J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967).
3 3 See, e.g., E. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER 165 (1964).
34 A BLAUSTEIN & C. PORTER, THE AMERICAN LAWYER 46-51 (1954).
3 5 J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 302 (1950); H.
JACOB, supra note 9, at 59-61.
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primarily engaged in preventive law-attempting to foresee contingencies
and preparing "boilerplate" to protect their interests. Ideally, each busi-
ness transaction is taken out of the realm of legal dispute. Preventive law
developments have a widespread effect on the many similar legal situa-
tions faced by the large-volume litigant. Furthermore, the "boilerplate"
provision or other drafting technique developed gains momentum each
time it is used in a business transaction. If the development is challenged
in litigation at a later date, after many legal relationships have been suc-
cessfully based on it, the presumption of the development's propriety may
be hard to overcome. In other words, large-volume participants are often
able to create "bootstrap" law in the form of "customary business prac-
tices," which are abundantly recognized in the Uniform Commercial Code,
even without resorting to litigation.
36
Aside from planning to avoid litigation, large-volume participants, as
compared to single-case participants, are able to plan litigation and man-
age it more efficiently. Economies of scale in handling litigation are pres-
ent. A collection agency with a large volume of legal business may
computerize many of the routine preliminaries to litigation. Computers
can keep records, recall them at the appropriate times, type collection
letters, and even type pleadings.37 A business firm with retained counsel
or its own legal staff can institute legal proceedings without incurring large
start-up costs.
Further, the large-volume participant can promise a steady, lucrative
flow of similar cases to the legal practitioner. In most instances, this
guaranteed flow of business means that the large-volume participant is
able to obtain high-quality legal counsel whereas the single-case partic-
ipant is not. The large volume of similar cases also allows counsel to spe-
cialize. The law, like most professions today, is becoming more
speoialized. 38 The specialist can keep abreast of events in his area of
legal practice. This task is often too great for more than one or two areas
of law. The advantages of specialization are similar to the advantages of
large volume. The specialist can handle routine cases more expeditiously
than the nonspecialist. He is able to bring more sophistication to bear
on problem cases than is the generalist. The specialist is also better able
to plan preventive law strategies. Specialization is typically associated with
greater competence. The less competent attorneys are often forced into a
general practice in order to find enough clients to earn a living.3 9
The large-volume participant in the legal system has a major advantage
over the single-case participant in his ability to develop a litigation strat-
36 M. MAYER, THE LAWYERS 42-49 (1967). Mayer cites the example of the mis-
printed indentures for Japanese mortgage bonds which soon became the model
for the entire security industry because of their initial success. Id. at 43.
37 See generally COMPUTERS AND THE LAW (R. Bigelow ed. 1966). For example, a
small western Massachusetts collection law firm handles the caseload of a firm many
times its size by using computerized data retrieval.
38 M. RHEINSTEIN, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 301-03 (1967).
39 E. SMIGEL, supra note 33, at 141-60; M. MAYER, supra note 36, at 380-414.
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egy to maximize financial gains (or minimize losses) and to obtain fa-
vorable rule changes. The financial stake in each case for a large-volume
participant is small compared to the money represented by the total vol-
ume of cases. A collection agency doing millions of dollars of collection
business may have no single case worth more than five thousand dollars.
Thus, no single case is a major concern for the collection agency; it can
afford to settle or refuse to pursue any case which will not further its
litigation strategy. The large-volume litigant is able to achieve the most
favorable forum; emphasize different issues in different courts; take advan-
tage of differences in procedure among courts at the state and federal
levels; drop or compromise unpromising cases without fear of heavy fi-
nancial loss; stall some cases and push others; and create rule conflicts in
lower courts to encourage assumption of jurisdiction in higher courts.
This "lobbying" of the legal system is accomplished through test cases,
amicus curiae participation, bringing alternative actions in different fo-
rums, broadening the issues through expert witnesses, research and pub-
lication, and engaging in other forms of litigation planning.
40
The single-case participant, on the other hand, has little ability to plan
the litigation of his case when he opposes the large-volume participant.
The amount in controversy, though trivial to the large litigant, may be
very important to the small litigant. A poor personal-injury plaintiff with
out-of-pocket hospital and medical expenses cannot drop his case for the
sake of greater financial gain in other cases or for other litigants. He has
no other cases and needs the money. Furthermore, the single-case partic-
ipant can achieve no economies of scale. Nor is he likely to have special-
ized legal assistance on retainer to counsel him on legal matters and eco-
nomic planning for his daily life. The "lobbying" techniques of the large-
volume participant are unavailable to him. The single-case participant
enters the legal system at a distinct disadvantage.
Evidence of the use of litigation planning to maximize financial gains is
abundant in the settlement practices of automobile insurance companies.
Statistical studies indicate that approximately 85 percent of all personal
injury claimants recover something. However, the later in the negoti-
ation or litigation process that a final disposition of the claim is made, the
more likely is the claim to be underpaid (below any reasonable compen-
sation for injuries), and the less likely is the plaintiff to recover any-
thing.41 In other words, insurance companies fight the cases in which
they are likely to succeed and settle doubtful cases quickly, thereby sav-
ing themselves much time and money. The same type of planning, albeit
for a maximization of speedy convictions rather than for financial gains
(although financial savings is an issue), infuses the plea bargaining process.
40Hakman, Lobbying the Supreme Court-An Appraisal of "Political Science
Folklore," 35 FORDRAM L. REV. 15 (1966); cf. C. VOSE, supra note 10, at 50-73.
41 Franklin, Chanin & Mark, Accidents, Money and the Law: A Study of the
Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1961). A. CONARD, J.
MORGAN, R. PRATT, JR., C. VOLTZ & R. BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS
AND PAYMENTS 181-237 (1964).
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Single-case participants, defendants in these actions, are induced to bar-
gain for their liberty with large-volume participants, governments, in a
process which results in the conviction of 79 percent or more without
trial.
42
Both substantive and procedural rules are changed through the litiga-
tion process. The planned litigation strategy of the large-volume partic-
ipant can therefore be directed to favorable rule change as well as to the
maximization of immediate monetary gains. Cases which will make
"good" law for the large-volume participant can be contested and ap-
pealed, while those which might produce unfavorable outcomes can be
settled. The poor, single-case participant must settle for whatever fi-
nancial gain he can get in that single action. His choice is limited by his
own financial considerations and by the fact that he has but one case.
43
Although the single-case participant may choose to vindicate his position
rather -than gain financially, realistically this choice is rarely perceived or
made. The rarity of an individual's choice to ignore financial gain is illus-
trated by the accident case of Mr. Lin, who instructed his attorney not to
negotiate for a settlement at the pretrial conference. The judge was so
shocked by this attitude that he appointed a psychiatrist to examine Mr.
Lin.44 Furthermore, the canons of ethics would prevent an attorney for
a single-case participant from trying to influence his client to drop a case
that would create a bad precedent for other clients with similar cases.45
On the other hand, the canons of ethics do not prevent an attorney from
advising a corporation not to pursue some of its cases in order to prevent
setting a bad precedent for its other cases.
46
The large-volume litigant is a regular participant in the business of the
courts in which its specialized cases are heard. The regular participant
becomes an important part of the daily worklife of court personnel. He
is recognized as one with whom business must be done to his satisfaction;
the next day he will be back again. If the regular participant. is antag-
onized, he will be most unwilling to allow continuances, to make stipula-
tions, and to waive formalities without argument. These little courtesies
are necessary if the workload in the legal system is to remain tolerable.
4
42 Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty
Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865 (1964). The Supreme Court recognized the importance
and pervasiveness of this practice in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
43 See generally S. MACAULAY, supra note 13.
44 Katz, Mr. Lin's Accident Case: A Working Hypothesis on the Oriental Meaning
of Face in International Relations and the Grand Scheme, 78 YALE L.J. 1491, 1492
(1969).
45 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Ethical Considerations 4-5.
46 See generally J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY
BAR (1966) [hereinafter cited as NYC BAR SURVEY]; J. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR
OWN (1962); ci. J. HANDLER, THE LAWYER AND His COMMUNITY: THE PRACTICING
BAR IN A MIDDLE-SIZED CITY (1967).
47 See Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game, 1 LAW & Soc'Y REV.,
June, 1967, at 15.
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In this way, the large-volume participant has leverage in the legal system
to a degree that the single-case participant does not.
48
As Jerome Frank points out, litigation is a process of communication.
49
The parties must communicate their views to the judges, clerks, and bai-
liffs. The large-volume litigant, being a regular participant in a certain
court or before a certain judge, has a store of shared experiences and
meanings upon which to base this communication. The single-case partic-
ipant is less likely to have these common understandings upon which to
rely. A newly appointed, black judge in Boston, Massachusetts, once re-
marked that his knowledge of the common English usage of West Indians
had given him an interpretation of a witness' testimony that was entirely
different from the understanding gleaned by the attorneys and other court
officials. 50 The decision in the case hinged on this testimony. Similarly,
the views of polluters have more credibility with pollution control boards
whose membership is heavily weighted with representatives of polluting
industries than with boards which are not so weighted. 51
The real problem, however, is perhaps more subtle than the two exam-
ples would indicate. Large-volume litigants make up the repeat business
of courts and administrative agencies. Therefore, these bodies must be
oriented to the problems and desires of these litigants in order to achieve
efficient and effective administration. Furthermore, judges are most often
recruited from the ranks of attorneys who serve large-volume litigants.
It is the language of business with which judges are most familiar. It has
been this writer's experience that whenever a test case challenges the
business practices of a large-volume litigant, i.e., a business organization
or government agency, the questioning of the judge centers upon the ef-
fect that a ruling against the challenged practice would have on the cost
and efficiency of the handling of 'transactions of the large-volume litigant.
This judicial attitude is often manifested by hostility toward the poor,
single-case participant, his attorney, and his legal claim. The bench and
bar widely reflect the opinion that since the poor, by definition, do not
have the kinds of property or business interests that require legal action,
their legal claims must be frivolous.5 2 When a government-funded legal
services program represents poor litigants, the poor and their attorneys
are faced with the hostility of the bar toward both "socialized law" and
the encouragement of nugatory litigation. 53 These attitudes cannot help
48 This leverage is moderated to the extent that a single-case participant's attorney
is a regular participant in a particular court with a large volume of similar cases.
There are times when this form of social leverage acts upon the large-volume partici-
pant to channel his behavior into acceptable modes. But the acceptable modes them-
selves, for example, the canons of ethics, are generally favorable to the large volume,
organized, financially well-off participant. Id.
49 J. FRANK, supra note 6, at 186-89.
50 Statement made to court watchers under supervision of author.
51 Hill, Polluters Sit on Anti-Pollution Boards, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1970 at 1, col. 1.
52 Carlin & Howard, supra note 12, at 387.
53 See Stumpf & Janowitz, Judges and the Poor: Bench Responses to Federally Fi-
nanced Legal Services, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1058 (1969).
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but redound to the benefit of the large-volume business or governmental
litigant.
B. The Stratified Legal Profession
That those with more money have some advantages in court over those
who have considerably less is not necessarily a shocking or intolerable
situation. However, revelation of the full extent of these advantages and of
the rigid stratification of the legal profession goes well beyond the expec-
tations of most citizens and even most lawyers. It is at this point that the
original pluralist assumptions face their most crucial test and, in the eyes
of many, do not stand up.
As reported by Carlin in his study of the New York bar54 and con-
firmed by several studies of lawyers in other geographical areas, 55 a stable
system of social stratification pervades the legal profession.
The elite in this system are the lawyers in large firms (21 per
cent of the bar), while the lowest stratum is composed of law-
yers in small firms and individual practice (64 per cent of all
lawyers); the remaining 15 per cent are the middle stratum
lawyers in the medium-sized firms. Large firm lawyers have the
highest average income, represent the most affluent and highest-
status clients, and have most contact with higher levels of the
judiciary and government. Individual practitioners and small-
firm lawyers have the lowest incomes, represent the least afflu-
ent and lowest-status clients, and deal largely with lowest-level
courts and agencies.
56
Few lawyers represent those who cannot afford the minimum recom-
mended fee. Those who do represent the poor are of the lowest status
within the legal profession. These attorneys have attended the least presti-
gious law schools, have graduated with the fewest honors, and are gener-
ally the least competent. The socioeconomic background of a lawyer's
parents typically determines what status he will have in the profession.5
Furthermore, the low-status lawyers who represent a significant number
of poor clients spend less time on, and provide fewer services for, these
clients as compared with their other clients.58 As one commentator states:
In giving advice about types of actions, places of jurisdiction,
gathering of evidence, negotiation and litigation, a lawyer must
consider carefully his client's finances. Sound professional guid-
ance is useless if the client cannot pay the costs involved.5 9
54 NYC BAR SURVEY, supra note 46 at 11-40.
55 See J. CARLIN, supra note 46; J. HANDLER, supra note 46, at 35-68; H. O'GOR-
MAN, LAWYERS AND MATRIMONIAL CASES (1963); E. SMIGEL, supra note 33, at 171-
204; Ladinsky, Careers of Lawyers, Law Practice, and Legal Institutions, 28 AM.
SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 47 (1963).
56 NYC BAR SURVEY, supra note 46, at 22-23. By 1966, less than half of all lawyers
were solo practitioners. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATIS-
TICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 155 (1970).
57 Ladinsky, supra note 55, at 53-54.
58 Carlin & Howard, supra note 12, at 384.
59 H. O'GORMAN, supra note 55, at 61.
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In other words, even private lawyers who serve the poor and are con-
cerned about the welfare of these clients must nevertheless deny them vig-
orous representation because of the cost of such representation. The
affluent client does not encounter this barrier.
The stratification of the bar is evidenced by the types of cases handled
by large firms, small firms, and individual practitioners respectively. The
great majority of large-firm lawyers are specialists, while a very small
percentage of individual practitioners specialize. Although a majority of
the work of all lawyers is business related, the amount of nonbusiness
and nonprobate work done by large-firm lawyers is infinitesimal. Within
the business law practice, large corporations are represented by large-
firm lawyers. Large-firm lawyers handle antitrust, securities, financing and
organizational matters. Small-firm practitioners serve small businesses. In-
dividual practitioners are likely to serve small businesses by doing per-
sonal work for employees or businessmen, minor labor relation matters,
zoning permits, and licenses. The bulk of criminal, divorce, and personal
injury work is done by the lowest-status segment of the bar.60
Large-firm lawyers spend considerably less time in court than do indi-
vidual practitioners. The large-firm attorneys are business advisers whose
practice is largely preventive law. When the large-firm lawyer deals with
a court, an administrative agency, or a government official, it is at a high
level: the federal courts, federal agencies and only the highest level fed-
eral and state officials.
61
The income of the large-firm lawyer is also considerably higher than
that of the small-firm lawyer or individual practitioner. 62 Social distance
between lawyers of different statuses is great. High-status lawyers in big
cities are differentiated from low-status lawyers by religion, social class
origin, race, choice of college and law school, and grades in law school.
Partners in large firms are predominantly white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant,
and Ivy League graduates with high grades. Except for being white, very
few individual practitioners meet any, let alone all, of these criteria.63
Furthermore, lawyers primarily have contact with other lawyers, judges,
and officials of a similar status as their own. In the Carlin study of the
New York bar, three-fourths of the individual practitioners reported no
contact with large-firm lawyers. 64 This interaction pattern makes identi-
fication with and understanding of the problems of low-status lawyers and
their clients difficult.
With the bar stratified in this manner, it becomes clear who has access
to the highest status, most highly competent attorneys. These attorneys
come at a high price. Only those with great financial resources and a large
volume of business over which to spread costs, generally large business
organizations, can afford the services of these attorneys. The lawyers who
60 NYC BAR SURVEY, supra note 46, at 25-26.
61 Id. at 26-27.
62 id. at 27.
63 Id. at 28-32; Ladinsky, supra note 55, at 47-54.
64 NYC BAR SURVEY, supra note 46, at 34-35.
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are not trained as well become sole practitioners or work in small firms
and handle mostly individual clients. 65 David Riesman has characterized,
perhaps too strongly, the view of the high-status lawyers toward the low-
status membership of the big city bar as an "intellectual slum" where
"a largely ethnic bar carries on the Anglo-Saxon rites of trial by jury and
'contaminates' the legal ideal with the demagogic practice." 66
C. Other Hindrances
In addition to counsel fees, other costs make vigorous and competent
litigation efforts by poor individuals difficult. Court costs, witness fees
(especially for experts), investigation costs, court reporter fees, discovery
costs, transcript costs, and the cost of any bond needed to secure oppo-
nents' damages, all make litigation an expensive task, thereby giving the
advantage to those with large financial resources.
67
The settlement practices of automobile insurance companies68 clearly
show the use of financial leverage, as do the other forms of litigation plan-
ning. Delay is a powerful weapon of the financially secure. The poor
person whose auto is wrongfully repossessed may need it immediately
but is unable to post the replevin bond or pursue his claim through the
courts. He, therefore, is likely to either settle, by paying money he may
not owe, or merely reconcile himself to the loss of his car. Statutes that
allow confessions of judgment and repossession without resorting to the
courts, as well as bond requirements and summary procedures for re-
plevin, eviction, and injunctive relief, have the effect of putting the finan-
cially secure litigant in possession or control of the subject matter of the
litigation.69 The litigant with financial resources and the subject of the
litigation already in his control can use his expert legal assistance to pro-
long the procedural delay inherent in the present legal system.
The norms of the legal system, whether substantive or procedural, may
be altered by political processes as well as by the judicial branch of gov-
ernment. Statutes can operate to the advantage of the financially power-
ful interest. Organization and financial resources are also the foundations
of success in the political system. Large, organized interests have power-
ful lobbies and support in legislatures, 70 administrative agencies (which
supposedly regulate the activities of these powerful interests),71 and the
executive branch.72 The circulation of high-status lawyers between indus-
try, Washington and New York law firms, and the federal government has
65 Ladinsky, supra note 55, at 53-54.
66 Riesman, Law and Sociology: Recruitment, Training and Colleagueship, 9 STAN.
L. REV. 643, 665 (1957).
67 S. MOORE, JR., RELIEF OF INDIGENTS FROM FINANCIAL BARRIERS TO EQUAL JUS-
TICE IN AMERICAN CIVIL COURTS 37-57 (1971).
68 See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
69 Carlin, Howard & Messinger, Civil Justice and the Poor, 1 LAW AND Soc'Y REV.
9, 12-17 (Nov., 1966). See generally D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE (1967).
70 See generally T. LOWi, THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1969).
71 See generally G. KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION 1877-1916 (1965).
72 See generally C. MILLS, THE POWER ELITE (1956).
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been thoroughly documented.7 3 Since poor, single-case participants in the
legal system do not have access to these high-status lawyers and are not
members of organizations with large financial resources, they are unlikely
to be able to instigate rule changes favorable to them through the legisla-
tive or administrative processes of government. The poor are even less
able to influence the myriad private decisions made by large-scale busi-
ness organizations. These decisions then become the basis for the legal
sanction of contractual rights and customary business practices. That these
decisions affect the poor and their success in the legal system is recog-
nized even by the staunchest supporters of the corporate form of business
organization.1
4
IV. THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN ATTORNEYS
FOR THE POOR AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM
A. History
Early efforts to provide legal assistance for the poor could not really
be called a confrontation with the legal system for two reasons: first,
because of the limited scope of the efforts, and second, because the efforts
were motivated by a fear of unrest among the poor combined with great
confidence in the fairness of the substantive law.7 5 The turn of the twen-
tieth century saw the beginning of an organized movement to provide
legal assistance for the poor. By 1919, fifty thousand persons had received
legal aid with an expenditure of less than ninety thousand dollars. 76 In
that year, Reginald Heber Smith, in his classic work Justice and the Poor,
stated:
The administration of American justice is not impartial, the
rich and the poor do not stand on an equality before the law,
-the traditional method of providing justice has operated to close
the doors of the courts to the poor, and has caused a gross de-
nial of justice in all parts of the country to millions of persons. 77
Yet in 1951, Emery Brownell in his study, Legal Aid in the United
States, commented colorfully, but with classic understatement:
Like the Red Queen of Alice in Wonderland, the Legal Aid
forces have been obliged to run as fast as they could to stay
where they were. 78
73 See generally C. HORSKY, THE WASHINGTON LAWYERS (1952); cf. J. GOULDEN,
THE SUPER-LAWYERS (1972); M. MAYER, supra note 36, at 305-414; E. SMIGEL, supra
note 33.
74 See, e.g., Gossett, Balances and Controls in Private Policy and Decision-Making,
in LAW IN A CHANGING AMERICA 26-42 (G. Hazard ed. 1968).
75 Pipkin, Legal Aid and Elitism in the American Legal Profession, in JUSTICE
AND THE POOR xi-xii (P. Smith ed. 1972).
76 Masotti & Corsi, Legal Assistance for the Poor: An Analysis and Evaluation of
Two Programs, 44 J. URBAN L. 483, 487 (1967).
77 R. SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 8 (1919).
78 E. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES 33 (1951).
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At that time, less than two million dollars were being spent on civil legal
aid in the United States. By 1969, however, free civil legal assistance was
provided to the poor in over one million cases at a cost of over fifty mil-
lion dollars. 79 The need for legal services is virtually insatiable. Five
hundred million dollars is considered not an unreasonable estimate of the
cost of adequate legal services for the poor.8s Every American could use
legal advice and preventive legal assistance; few can afford it. s '
The major reason for the dramatic rise in the caseload and expendi-
tures for legal assistance to the poor was the creation of the Office of Eco-
nomic Opportunity (OEO) Legal Services Program. This program was
established in 1965 under Title II of the Economic Opportunity Act of
1964.82 The purposes of the program were:
1. To provide quality legal service to the greatest possible num-
ber consistent with the size of the staff and the other goals of
this program.
2. To educate target area residents about their legal rights and
responsibilities in substantive areas of concern to them.
3. To ascertain what rules of law affecting the poor should be
changed to benefit the poor and to achieve such changes ei-
ther through the test case and appeal, statutory reform or
changes in the administrative process.
4. To serve as advocate for the poor in the social decision mak-
ing process. [I.e.] to provide for the poor the same type of
concerned advocacy that others have long enjoyed.
5. To assist poor people in the formulation of self-help groups
such as cooperative purchasing organizations, merchandising
ventures, and other business ventures.
6. To involve the poor in the decision-making process of .the
legal services program, and to the extent feasible, to include
target area residents on the staff of the program.
8 3
These purposes were sufficiently broad to include several theories of
how legal services should be delivered to the poor. These theories, pro-
pounded in response to the realities of the legal system and defects in
existing legal services to the poor, developed along lines similar to those
evolved by private practitioners. The major role of the private legal prac-
titioner has progressed from individual client representation on an ad hoc
and remedial basis to planned and more aggressive litigation, retainer
79 NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASs'N, 1970 STATISTICS OF LEGAL AID AND DE-
FENDER WORK IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA Vi (M. Stiegler ed. 1970).
80 Pipkin, supra note 75, at xxv.
81 That this is true even for the nonpoor is indicated by the increased usage of law-
yers by members of prepaid group legal services programs. See Calame, Call My
Lawyer, Wall Street Journal, May 17, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
82 42 U.S.C. § 2809(a)(3) (1970). Cf. Pye, The Role of Legal Services in the Anti-
poverty Program, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 211 (1966).
83 OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM, EVALUATION
MANUAL 1-2 (1967), in Stumpf, Law and Poverty: A Political Perspective, 1968 WiS.
L. REV. 694, 697 (1968).
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arrangements, lobbying for and maintenance of business organizations
(from the late 1800's to the 1930's), and finally to direct participation in
the creation, financing, and economic planning of large scale business or-
ganizations. Similarly, poverty law theories have progressed from the legal
aid theory of individual, ad hoc, and remedial services to theories (both
local control and grand strategy theories) that emphasize group represen-
tation, legal maintenance of community organizations, and planned, ag-
gressive, test-case litigation and finally to theories that stress economic
development and planning, legal self-sufficiency, and avoidance of litiga-
tion. The theories or approaches to legal services will be explained in
more detail.
The traditional legal aid approach, by its very label, connotes a long-
standing method of providing legal services to the poor. This approach
was the one espoused by the leaders of the legal aid movement at the
turn of the twentieth century. Such an approach was directed toward
dealing with the problems that individuals encountered in their daily
lives--domestic problems, creditor harassment, landlord-tenant disputes,
and problems with government agencies. Each case was handled on an
ad hoc basis using the techniques of accommodation, compromise, and,
as a last resort, litigation. The theory presumed that the poor needed only
to assert their established legal rights in order to improve their condi-
tion.8
4
B. Criticism of Past and Existing Programs
Legal aid societies have been consistently criticized for the quality of
their services. Much of this criticism can be answered by the fact that
the societies have traditionally been underfinanced and understaffed. At-
torneys serve on a voluntary basis or are paid meager salaries. In 1964,
immediately prior to the inception of the OEO Legal Services Program,
each legal aid attorney in New York City averaged well over 1,000 cases
annually, Only 2 percent of the private attorneys in New York annually
handled more than 500 cases each, while half of the private attorneys
annually handled less than fifty cases each. 5
More fundamental criticisms, however, were not so easily answered.
Marvin Frankel suggested to the American Bar Association that the legal
aid societies were prevented from providing high quality legal assistance
to the poor by several institutional problems: their old and established
nature led to the negative impacts of routine and settled bureaucratization;
the treatment of legal aid as a charitable program of the bar and the
business community, without any participation of the poor, smacked of
welfare colonialism; legal aid societies traditionally had a centralized
downtown office which was not easily accessible to many of the poor; and
the societies had failed to do more active outreach and educational work
84 Hazard, Social Justice through Civil Justice, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 699, 701 (1969).
85 Note, Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave in Legal Services for the Poor,
80 HARv. L. REv. 805, 807 (1967).
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among the poor.s 6 Monrad Paulsen added to these criticisms by charging
that legal aid had failed to aim for constructive social changes, which
required focusing on social reform and attacking established institutions,
practices, and rules.87
1. Neighborhood-Controlled Legal Services-The War on Poverty, in
answer to criticisms of other services to the poor, was conceived as a
wide-spectrum, centrally planned attack on the problems of the poor. The
architects of the OEO, fearing that a massive, federally directed approach
might override or ignore the real interests of the poor, sought a gadfly to
constantly bring the local needs of the poor into focus. For this reason,
the neighborhood-controlled legal services concept was developed. The
major statement of this concept was made by Jean and Edgar Cahn. 88
The essence of this approach to legal assistance was the funding of legal
services projects in local communities to serve as advocates for neighbor-
hood groups. The priorities of the projects would be set by the client
groups themselves. The purpose of this approach was to ensure contin-
uous responsiveness to the needs of the poor by the legal services pro-
jects and, through the advocacy of the poverty lawyers, by the forces of
the War on Poverty.89  I
While the neighborhood control approach seems to answer some of the
criticisms of the traditional legal aid approach, most notably those of
Frankel, it is not necessarily responsive to Paulsen's criticism. If what is
necessary is a centrally planned legal attack on established institutions,
practices, and rules in the interest of broad social reform, then the decen-
tralized, neighborhood-controlled offices are not the appropriate instru-
ments for such a policy. Each neighborhood office would respond to dif-
ferent priorities set by different people. Poor neighborhoods have local
establishments, leadership, institutions, practices, and rules which allow
some people to benefit at the expense of others. Neighborhood offices
might fall under the control of the local establishment or, at the very least,
be prevented from challenging established neighborhood groups and prac-
tices for fear of losing their credibility and support in the neighbor-
hood. 90 The defects in the neighborhood ;offices were pointed out most
eloquently by the Cahns themselves:
The typical neighborhood law firms today look very much like
the legal aid offices they were to improve upon with the excep-
tion that they are decentralized and take cases heretofore not
handled by anyone.
86 Frankel, Experiments in Serving the Indigent, 51 A.B.A.J. 460 (1965).
87 Paulsen, The Expanding Horizons of Legal Services, 67 W. VA. L. REv. 179,
189 (1965).
88 See Cahn & Cahn, supra note 12.
89 Pious, Policy and Public Administration: The Legal Services Program in the War
on Poverty, 1 POL. & Soc'Y 365, 367-68 (1971).
90 For an excellent, concrete example of the tension between the neighborhood con-
trol and the grand strategy approaches implied by the foregoing criticisms see Carlin,
Storefront Lawyers in San Francisco, 7 TRANS-AcTION 64 (1970); cf. Brill, supra note
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The case load mounts steadily. Demand begins quickly to edge
past the point of conscientious performance-and neighborhood
staff lawyers shortly find themselves inundated with demands
for service.
The client is almost invariably an individual already in some
kind of difficulty. Assistance is typically after the fact.
Achievements by and large must be counted in terms of in-
dividual clients helped-and occasionally, new precedents esta-
lished-but not in terms of administrative or commercial prac-
tices demonstrably altered.
Little if any research is being carried on that could effect
significant legal change unconnected with specific cases.
There is a pervasive absence of any relationship between
legal service programs and the organization of citizen groups
such as tenant councils, welfare mothers' organizations, or con-
sumer groups.
Nonprofessionals are receiving very little training that would
enable them to carry out functions now performed unnecessarily
by lawyers because few offices have been established with a
lead time for planning or a built-in training and internship pro-
gram.91
2. The Grand Strategy Theory-This approach uses the desegregation
litigation strategy of the NAACP as a model. Major attention is paid to
the representation of groups concerned with reform of the social and gov-
ernmental structure affecting the poor. Law reform through aggressive
complaint, protest, lobbying, and litigation is stressed. 92 This approach
became the officially encouraged OEO Legal Services policy with the ap-
pointment of Earl Johnson to the directorship in 1966. He used three
criteria for evaluating the performance of local projects: a) whether and
to what extent the project engaged in law reform activities, particularly
test-case litigation; b) whether and to what extent the project engaged in
community education; and c) whether the project had representatives of
the poor on the governing board.
93
The grand strategy theory of legal assistance for the poor meets Paul-
sen's criticism and fits into the original, central-planning concept of the
War on Poverty. The Cahns, as usual, phrased the theory more eloquently
in terms of the "consumer perspective." The task was to stimulate the
poor's demands for effective redress through the legal system. This was
to be accomplished by a) encouraging and aiding the assertion of hereto-
fore nominally or ambiguously conferred rights and entitlements; b) the
legitimation of previously unacknowledged grievances; c) the raising of
expectations and awareness which would allow the recognition of griev-
ances and injuries done to the poor; d) lowering the cost in social re-
91 Cahn & Cahn, What Price Justice: The Civilian Perspective Revisited, 41 NOTRE
DAME LAWYER 927, 928 (1966).
92 Hazard, supra note 84, at 701-02.
93 Pious, supra note 89, at 378.
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sources (sophistication, perseverance, deprivation of benefits, articulate-
ness, humiliation) through organized professional advocates to assert rights
and grievances.
94
The argument against the grand strategy approach is that it leads to the
sacrifice of individual client services for time- and resource-consuming
law reform efforts which do not and can not remedy the structural defects
in the economic and political systems that make and keep people poor.
In one critic's terms: social justice for the poor is not realizable through
civil justice. Many legal wrongs committed against the poor can be rem-
edied without substantial improvement in their living conditions. For ex-
ample, housing codes in poor neighborhoods may be strictly enforced.
However, this drives the cost of the housing up and drives out many of
the poor. And, while courts may require welfare procedures and benefit
distribution to be more equitable, they cannot require that benefits match
the cost of living. In other words, the basic issue for the poor is the dis-
tribution of wealth. Legal strategies have been notably unsuccessful in
changing this distribution.95
3. Encouragement of Community Autonomy-Another approach to
legal assistance for the poor addresses the problem of poor communities
functioning in a market economy. This strategy utilizes what has been the
hallmark of the modern, successful lawyer-the ability to assist the or-
ganization, financing, and planning of economic enterprises. The attorney
becomes corporate counsel -to the poor and works to attract public and
private investment in the poor community. He helps create housing cor-
porations, retail stores, manufacturing, investment and banking firms op-
erating within and controlled by the poor community.96 The ideal of this
approach is the self-sufficient, cooperatively organized neighborhood,
which might even develop into a politically autonomous governmental
entity.
This approach too is not free from criticism. Deteriorating communities
are risky areas for investment. Small businesses of any kind are not in
an advantageous economic position. The expertise required for large-scale
economic enterprises often is available neither in poor communities nor in
legal services projects.
Against this background of approaches to providing legal services, it
must be realized that a given legal assistance project does not wholly or
solely act according to one of the above theories. Rather, the techniques
used by lawyers for the poor have been developd in response to the same
demands that exist for the rest of the legal profession. Lawyers for the
poor have merely borrowed from the weapons arsenal of lawyers for
large-volume participants in the legal system, in an attempt to duplicate,
or rather to offset, the advantages of these large-volume participants. Not
94 Cahn & Cahn, supra note 91, at 942.
95 Hazard, supra note 84, at 706-11; cf. Brill, supra note 1, at 42-43.
96 Memo from Burt Griffin, OEO Legal Services Director, to legal services pro-
grams, July 16, 1968.
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only have legal assistance techniques been developed in response to the
same problems faced by private practitioners, but the techniques have
also developed in the same relative chronological order, although in a
compressed time frame.
Large-volume participants have access to highly trained legal specialists
for whom the large-volume client's caseload is a priority matter. The
OEO Legal Services Program has, in this regard, made a relatively suc-
cessful attempt to attract high-quality law school graduates as full-time
staff for its local agencies and back-up centers. The attraction for these
young lawyers has been non-monetary. They have come to participate in
a new and exciting type of legal work, to serve a hitherto unrepresented
community, and to effect social change. What many of these lawyers lack
in experience, compared to their high-status counterparts in private prac-
tice, they make up for in commitment and ingenuity. The local legal ser-
vices projects that have been most successful in maintaining a dynamic,
social-change-oriented approach have been able to compete with the best
law firms for top law school graduates.
97
Specialization has also been brought to bear on the problems of the
poor. A local project that has more -than two attorneys usually refers cer-
tain types of cases to particular staff attorneys. Each attorney thereby
develops expertise in and efficient techniques for handling matters in par-
icular areas of law. He may be able to join and consolidate cases if the
facts warrant such action, and he can quickly become aware of major
problem areas in his community. Furthermore, the Legal Services Program
has enlisted the aid of many universities to provide back-up centers for
research -into particular areas of law. Presently, there are eighteen such
centers and a clearinghouse that provide specialized research, training,
advice, and a nationwide communications link-up to legal services project
attorneys. In some areas of law, the resources available to attorneys for
the poor even exceed those available to large, prestigious law firms.98
Attorneys for the poor have also attempted to offset the advantages that
large-volume paricipants have in generating favorable rule changes. The
frequent use of class actions on behalf of the poor is an effort to plan lit-
igation so that a case becomes of economic consequence to the large-
volume litigant who opposes the claim. The case can not easily be settled
by the large-volume litigant, even if losing might mean the establishment
of a bad precedent. Those persons within the poor-client class whose cases
may not be as favorable as others can be dropped from the class and
their cases pursued separately. The loss of a few members of the class
through settlement or disinterest does not prevent the claim from being
litigated through higher courts. Test cases can be developed and pursued
97 Finman, OEO Legal Service Programs and the Pursuit of Social Change: The
Relationship Between Program Ideology and Program Performance, 1971 Wis. L.
REV. 1001, 1060 n.119, 1061.
98 As this article is going into print, actions by the Nixon administration with re-
gard to OEO and the Legal Services Program jeopardize these and other resources
available to attorneys for the poor.
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to effect reforms in the law. Every local project, tied together by the com-
munications network, can screen clients for the proper fact situations on
which to base a test case. As more than one project director has said to
a back-up center: "You give me the case and I'll find you a client." The
existence of nationwide and regional communications between legal ser-
vices projects allows advance preparation for test cases, forum shopping,
the preparation of amicus curiae briefs, and the creation of appellate
court disagreements to facilitate review in higher courts. Collective action
has meant that the poor can also lobby the judicial system.
The aggressive case-handling techniques and the access to research cen-
ters and clearinghouses have enabled the legal services projects to prac-
tice preventive law and to create "bootstrap law" favorable to the poor.
The Center for Social Welfare Policy and Law, established at Columbia
University in 1965, has engaged in critical research into the workings and
content of the welfare system. As a result of this research, legal materials
on residency requirements, maximum grants, fair hearings, and several
other aspects of the welfare system have been made available to legal
services projects. Legal services attorneys are prepared in advance for
the contingencies that may affect their clients. Similarly, the Housing and
Economic Development Project at Berkeley, California has prepared
model briefs, complaints, motions, and answers for establishing new de-
fenses and affirmative actions in landlord-tenant cases. They have devel-
oped collective bargaining agreements and tactics manuals for tenant
unions. The back-up centers also draft model legislation and regulations,
assist efforts to lobby for legislation favorable to the poor, and provide
continuing tax, financing, and development information for community
organizations. 9
Legal services projects also have attempted to encourage organization
among the poor. Organization may take the form of tenant unions, com-
munity development corporations, housing corporations, and profit-
making businesses. Legal services attorneys then serve as house counsel
to these organizations and, in that way, overcome the disadvantages of
serving a single-case participant. The attorney can aid the organization in
incorporating and, thereafter, can function in the same manner as a cor-
porate attorney-picking and choosing the most favorable cases for legal
action and participating in planning the group's activities. Very often a
legal grievance shared by a large number of people and recognized by the
legal services attorney becomes the basis for an organization; aggressive
legal action helps the organization expand its constituency. 100 The polit-
ical and economic advantages that an organization with access to expert
assistance can gain will accrue, at least to some extent, to the poor.
Finally, legal services projects have attempted to make the poor self-
sufficient by conducting community education programs dealing with legal
99 See Sullivan, Law Reform and the Legal Services Crisis, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 1
(1971).
100 Finman, supra note 97, at 10 15-20.
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problems, training members of the poor communities as advocates in legal
matters, working to delegalize many of the problems which constantly
face the poor, and helping the poor to obtain public and private funds for
their own programs and businesses. 10 1 Primary or preventive legal ser-
vice requires that the poor client know when to consult an attorney and
how to conduct his daily activities so as to avoid legally disadvantageous
situations.
Most of these tactics and resources are used, to some degree, by every
lawyer who serves the poor in legal services projects or legal aid societies.
The degree of use, however, depends on the theory of legal services de-
livery held by the particular attorneys in the agency.
10 2
V. CONCLUSION
The criticism of the scope and aggressiveness of legal services' attack
on the problems of the poor is not well taken. The critics show an incred-
ibly selective blindness to the nature of the legal system and to the regular
practices of those who represent large economic and political organiza-
tions. Objections to the wholesale adoption by legal services agencies of
the legal techniques that are common to the dominant organizations in
American society may be more to the point.1 3 However, the poor are
also entitled to have their attorneys respond to legal disputes in ways that
have proved successful in meeting the exigencies of a pluralist legal sys-
tem.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 1062-76. See generally K. FISHER & C. IVlE, FRANCISING JUSTICE: THE
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM AND TRADITIONAL
LEGAL AnD (1971).
103 See generally LAw AGAINST THE PEOPLE (R. Lefcourt ed. 1971).
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